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OF REASONABLE READERS AND UNREASONABLE SPEAKERS:
LIBEL LAW IN A NETWORKED WORLD'
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and RonNell Andersen Jones
Social-media libel cases require courts to map existing
defamation doctrines onto social-media fact patterns in ways
that create adequate breathing space for expression without
licensing character assassination. This Article explores these
challenges by investigating developments involving two
important constitutional doctrines-the so-called opinion
privilege, which protects statements that are unverifiable or
cannot be regarded as stating actual facts about a person, and
the actual malice rule, which requires defamation plaintifs who
are public officials or public figures to prove that the defendant
made a defamatory statement with knowledge of or reckless
disregard for, its falsity. Given the critical role these two
constitutional doctrines play in protecting free expression, it is
especially crucial that courts apply them in social-media cases
with due regard for the unique aspects of the medium. This
article 's analysis of early social-media cases reveals that
many-though by no means all-courts addressing these cases
appreciate that social media are diferent than the media that
preceded them. However, some of these courts have floundered
in adapting constitutional doctrines. The Article addresses the
most difficult new issues faced by courts and offers specific
prescriptions for adapting the opinion privilege and actual
malice rule to social media. It recommends that the opinion
privilege be applied based on a thorough understanding of both
the internal and external contexts of social-media expression
and that this broad reading of the opinion privilege be offset by
a narrow reading of actual malice in cases involving delusional
or vengeful social-media speakers.
INTRODUCTIONIN 2014, a California jury rendered the first Twitter libel verdict in the
country. Somewhat surprisingly, the jury found that iconoclastic cele-
brity Courtney Love did not defame her former attorney by tweeting that
the attorney was "bought off." 2 Love's case was a signal moment in U.S.
1 Some of the cases discussed in this article were compiled by the authors
for an outline distributed in connection with Practising Law Institute's "Com-
munication Law in the Digital Age" continuing legal education program. See
RonNell Andersen Jones & Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Recent Developments in the
Law of Social Media Communications-2014, in 3 Comm. L. Digital Age 799
(2014).
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defamation law, because it required a jury to consider for the first time
how to interpret an allegedly libelous tweet. But Love's case is by no
means unique. As the communications landscape shifts and the number
of social-media libel cases grows, judges and juries will be forced to
adapt and apply to speakers like Courtney Love constitutional doctrines
originally developed to prevent libel judgments from chilling the speech
of professional journalists.
This is no easy task. Applying libel law to cases involving social
media is complicated, because social media differ from traditional mass
media in a number of relevant respects. Social media are Internet and
mobile-based technological platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Reddit that permit ordinary citizens to interact with others around the
globe, using technology they carry in their pockets or handbags. 3 Social-
media platforms make gathering and sharing information simple, inex-
pensive, and almost instantaneous. Thus, social media encourage infor-
mal and unmediated, or disintermediated, exchanges of ideas that tran-
scend geographical, social, and cultural boundaries.
From a constitutional and public policy perspective, social media
have the capacity to promote expressive freedoms in ways never pre-
viously imagined. Social media allow speakers to communicate informa-
tion, thoughts, ideas, and images to mass audiences, and, at times, to
mobilize those audiences to action.4 On the other hand, social media
magnify the potential for conflicts between free speech and the rights of
individuals to be free from defamation and other forms of harmful ex-
pression. From a strictly statistical standpoint, social-media usage is in-
creasing the number of libel lawsuits, because it exponentially expands
the number of people disseminating speech to mass audiences.5 Social-
media outlets also multiply the vectors for defamatory speech, because
the outlets encourage users to rate every person and experience they en-
counter and to do so in the most hyperbolic terms, all without the benefit
of journalistic training or editorial oversight. 6
2 See Eriq Gardner, Courtney Love Wins Twitter Defamation Trial,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 24, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.hollywoodreport
er.com/thr-esq/courtney-love-wins-twitter-defamation-673972. For further dis-
cussion of the Love case, see infra Section Ill.
3 Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The
Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 Bus. HORIZONS 59, 61
(2010), http://www.michaelhaenlein.eu/Publications/Kaplan,%20Andreas%20-
%20Users%2Oof/o20the%20world,%20unite.pdf.
4 See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1975 (2011) (discussing how citizens can use social media to spur government
action and reform).
5 Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyber-
space, 49 DUKE L. J. 855, 945 (2000) [hereinafter Silencing John Doe].
6 As of July 2015, for example, users of the online review site Yelp had
written 61 million reviews of businesses ranging from hair salons to burger
joints, and 138 million people in 29 countries visit Yelp monthly.
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Social-media libel cases are just beginning to make their way into
published judicial opinions around the world.7 These cases require courts
to map existing defamation doctrines onto social-media fact patterns in
ways that create adequate breathing space for expression without licens-
ing character assassination.8 In the United States, the challenges are best
illustrated by developments involving two important constitutional doc-
trines.
The first is the so-called opinion privilege, which protects statements
that are unverifiable or cannot be regarded as stating actual facts about a
person.9 The second is the actual malice rule, which requires defamation
plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures to prove that the de-
fendant made a defamatory statement with knowledge of, or reckless
disregard for, its falsity.10 Given the critical role these two constitutional
doctrines play in protecting free expression, it is especially crucial that
courts apply them in social-media cases with due regard for the unique
aspects of the medium. This article's analysis of early social-media cases
reveals that many-though by no means all-courts addressing these
cases seem to appreciate that social media are different than the media
that preceded them. However, some of these courts have floundered in
adapting constitutional doctrines.
To assist future courts, this article offers specific prescriptions for
how to adapt the opinion privilege and actual malice rule to social media.
First, judges must reshape and broadly apply the opinion privilege - the
constitutional doctrine protecting statements that are unverifiable or can-
not be interpreted as stating actual facts - based on a thorough under-
7 For example, Australia's first Twitter defamation case to proceed to full
trial ended in judgment for the plaintiff, a New South Wales teacher, in late
2013. Michaela Whitbourn, The Tweet That Cost $105,000, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-
news/The-tweet-that-cost-105000-20140304-341kl.html. And in early 2014, a
British court ordered a mother in a "landmark" Facebook libel case to pay for
defamatory statements made only to Facebook "friends" on a "locked" Face-
book profile. David Churchill, Mother Faces Paying £20,000 Damages over
Facebook "Libel," LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/mother-faces-paying-20000-damages-over-
facebook-libel-9114217.html. The United States calibrates the balance between
free expression and reputation differently than many countries around the world,
in part because the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment as limiting the ability of state common law to safeguard reputation.
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment (Kennedy
Sch. of Gov't Fac. Res. Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWPO5-021, 2005).
8 See, e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2014);
Seaton v. TripAdvisor, L.L.C., 728 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2013); Redmond v. Gawk-
er Media, L.L.C., No. CGC-l 1-508414, 2012 WL 3243507 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
10, 2012).
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990).
'
0 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
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standing of both the internal and external contexts of social-media ex-
pression. These contexts include the conventions of discourse within
social media generally, and within specific social-media platforms, as
well as the technological architecture of different social-media platforms.
By taking account of the unique contexts within social media, courts can
ensure adequate breathing space for expression.
Second, this broad reading of the opinion privilege should be offset
by a narrow reading of actual malice in cases involving defendants like
Courtney Love. In such cases, courts should be cognizant that social me-
dia sometimes allow delusional or vengeful speakers to engage in cam-
paigns of character assassination. Thus, courts should narrowly apply the
actual malice rule to prevent the delusional speaker from escaping lia-
bility simply because she believed the defamatory accusations she in-
vented about public figures or public officials.
I. CONTEXT MATTERS: APPLYING THE OPINION PRIVILEGE TO SOCIAL-
MEDIA FORUMS
The central question in all defamation cases is whether the defen-
dant's published or posted statement was false and defamatory." When
addressing this question, the U.S. Supreme Court has directed lower
courts that the First Amendment bars holding speakers liable for defama-
tion when they publish or post statements about matters of public con-
cern that are unverifiable (not provable as false) or cannot reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff. 12 This doctrine, 3
" The common law defines a defamatory statement as one that harms an
individual in the eyes of his or her community. For example, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts §559 defines a defamatory statement as one that "harm[s] the
reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or ... deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." However, as
explained in this section, the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
prevents courts from treating as defamatory statements that are not probably
false or cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts. See generally
LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 67, 74 (Jack Stark ed.,
2004) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF THE PRESS].
12 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18 (noting that there is no "wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion,"' but explaining that
precedent protects statements on matters of public concern that do not imply a
false assertion of fact). See also id at 20 (holding that statements are constitu-
tionally protected if they are not "provable as false" or cannot "'reasonably [be]
interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual"); Silencing John Doe,
supra note 5 (extensively discussing the application of the constitutional opinion
privilege in the online context).
1 While rooted in common law, this doctrine is distinct from the common
law protections surrounding fair comment. See MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A.
ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND
2016]1 I159
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known as the opinion privilege, requires courts to place themselves in
the shoes of reasonable readers of the allegedly defamatory statement1 4
to determine whether a defendant's allegedly defamatory statement is
capable of being proven false, or whether it might be construed as satire,
parody, hyperbole, or another type of figurative speech.' 5 Determining
whether a statement published in a newspaper or magazine falls into one
of these categories requires close consideration of the exact language
used, as well as the internal and external context.1 6 Put another way, the
allegedly defamatory statement's meaning is a function of both the ver-
bal and social context of the statement.' 7
Contextual clues are equally crucial in interpreting allegedly defa-
matory statements made in social media, but internal and external con-
texts are often different. Thus, if courts are to give sufficient breathing
space for expression in social media, they should not simply interpret
MATERIALS 246 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing the origins of the common law fair
comment privilege) [hereinafter MASS MEDIA LAW].
14 In the new social-media landscape, as has always been the case in defa-
mation law, courts would do well to remember that there is no such thing as a
reasonable reader: the reasonable reader, like the reasonable person of tort law,
is a legal construct. The reasonable reader is not the average reader but is in-
stead a hypothesized reader who is a sophisticated decoder of the contextual
clues provided to reach the meaning that social norms suggest she should reach.
See David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of
Libel, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 81, 104 (1991). By the same logic, the reasonable
reader of social-media texts is one who decodes them consistently with sophisti-
cated actual readers-those aware of discourses conventions within the medium
and the technological architectures that may alter meaning. Determining mean-
ing according to this hypothesized reasonable reader protects important public
policy interests, including safeguarding the vitality of discourse both in tradi-
tional and new media of expression. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody ' Fools:
The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 842
(2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has "clearly endorsed the principle that
speakers should not be liable for 'mis-readings' of their speech by idiosyncratic
or unsophisticated audience members" because imposing such liability would
leave insufficient breathing space for free expression). In FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007), Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by Justice Alito, explained that the First Amendment requires the line between
protected and unprotected political speech to be drawn based on a reasonable
interpretation of what the effect on the audience was likely to be rather than the
actual effects. Otherwise, the search for empirical evidence of "actual effects"
would be likely to "chill a substantial amount of political speech." Id.
" Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. See also Silencing John Doe, supra note 5, at
926 (discussing the scope of the opinion privilege).
16 See Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for Communica-
tions Containing Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
863, 876 (2003).
17 See Jeffrey E. Thomas, A Pragmatic Approach to Meaning in Defamation
Law, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 346-47 (1999).
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tweets or Facebook posts in light of the conventions of traditional print
media. In addition to the specific language that comprises each statement,
courts must become familiar with the architectural constraints that go-
vern social-media usage, conventions of discourse within each social
forum, and even patterns of communication between different subgroups
within the particular medium.
A. Considering the Internal Context of Social Media
1. Character Limits and Strings of Tweets
The architectural features of most social-media applications form
one aspect of the internal context of statements made on social media.
These architectures often significantly constrain the context, complicat-
ing the determination of whether an allegedly defamatory statement is
constitutionally protected opinion. For example, consider Twitter's 140-
character limit on posts. A speaker has little opportunity to provide con-
text or to mark her post clearly as hyperbole in a 140-character tweet.
Therefore, to determine whether the defendant's tweet was constitution-
ally protected opinion, a court should examine the defendant's entire
string of tweets and the tweets to which she was responding. A subse-
quent tweet might defuse the defamatory sting of the original and at least
should be relevant to whether the defendant knew of, or recklessly disre-
garded, falsity, or whether the defendant attempted a retraction. However,
it is important to note that not all readers of the original tweet will read
subsequent tweets, even though they have the option.
From this perspective, Twitter libel cases are analogous to cases in-
volving defamatory meanings that arise in newspaper headlines, in
which courts typically consider the allegedly defamatory headline within
the broader context of the article of which it is a part.' 8 Or, as one court
stated, "defamatory meaning must be found, if at all, in a reading of the
publication as a whole"' 9 rather than "snippets taken out of context."20
18 See, e.g., Sprouse v. Clay Commc'n, Inc., 211 S.E. 2d 674, 686 (W. Va.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975); King, supra note 16; Leonard M. Nie-
hoff, Viewpoint, Opinions, Implications, and Confusions, 28 CoMM. LAW. 19
(2011):
The law of defamation assumes, for example, that those
who read an article in a newspaper do not just look at the
headline; they read the entire piece; they take statements in
context; they give words their fair and usual meaning. We un-
derstand that the law here indulges in a fiction-perhaps even
an extravagant one-and it may well be the case that most
readers do not do any of these things, let alone all of them.
But the alternative is to allow for a form of heckler's veto,
where the predispositions and personalities of a less-than-
ideal audience determine the rights of the speaker.
19 Kaelin v. Globe Commc'ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Courts examine the totality of the circumstances of publication, includ-
ing the "nature and full content of the communication [and] the know-
ledge and understanding of the audience to whom the publication was
directed." 2 1 This contextual approach applies even when some readers
might only see the headline "standing alone" without reading the full
article.22 By analogy, courts should determine the meaning of a tweet-
and whether that meaning is defamatory-by examining the entire con-
text of the tweet, which would include the string of tweets of which it is
a part and the chronology of that string. This contextual approach may
leave some reputational harm uncompensated, at least where a portion of
the audience unreasonably interprets the defendant's tweet outside its
full internal context; however, this approach is necessary if freedom of
expression in social media is to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide
open." 2 3
Some courts have begun to recognize that the comment-thread infra-
structure of many social-media platforms can offer an important contex-
tual clue on the question of whether a statement constitutes an assertion
of defamatory fact or an expression of protected opinion. In Feld v.
Conway, 24 a Massachusetts district court judge was confronted with an
allegedly defamatory tweet arising out of a dispute over a thoroughbred
horse belonging to the plaintiff, which had been mistakenly shipped to a
horse auction and possibly slaughtered. The story of the mistake spread
quickly online, eventually producing a heated debate in forums used by
the thoroughbred horseracing community.25 In the course of the debate,
the defendant weighed in: in a tweet, defendant addressed the plaintiff by
name and then stated, "you are fucking crazy!" 26 The plaintiff argued
that the comment constituted a defamatory factual assertion about her
20 d
21 Balzaga v. Fox News Network, L.L.C., 173 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1338
(4th Dist. 2009).
22 Kaelin v. Globe Commc'ns. Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citing Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997). See
also Balzaga, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1339 ("the fact that a statement '[s]tanding
alone' could be construed as false is not sufficient to support a defamation
claim"); Clay Calvert, Daniel Axelrod, Sarah Papadelias & Linda Riedemann,
Bag Men and the Ghost of Richard Jewell: Some Legal and Ethical Lessons
About Implied Defamation, Headlines, and Reporting on Breaking Criminal
Activity from Barhoum v. NYP Holdings, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 407
(2014); Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for Communications
Containing Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 863
(2003).
23 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
24 16 F.Supp.3d I (D. Mass. 2014).25 Id. at 2.
26 id
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sanity that harmed her professional reputation because it appeared when
her name was entered into Internet search engines. 27
The Feld court rejected the argument that the tweet was defamatory.
The court emphasized that distinguishing hyperbole from assertion of
defamatory fact requires "examin[ing] the statement in its totality and in
the context in which it was uttered or published" and "consider[ing] all
the words used ... [and] all of the circumstances surrounding the state-
ment." 28 In the social-media setting, the court noted, this means that a
"tweet cannot be read in isolation, but in the context of the entire discus-
sion." 29 Because the larger thread of tweets of which it was a part was an
extensive, emotional debate about the plaintiff's potential responsibility
for the horse's disappearance, the comment, "when viewed in that con-
text, [could not] reasonably be understood to state actual facts about the
plaintiff's mental state., 30 Instead, it was "obviously intended as criti-
cism-that is, as opinion" about the larger discussion matter within the
thread. The court suggested that refusing to read the words of the indi-
vidual tweet literally, and instead consulting the full thread to lend con-
text, is the "way in which a reasonable person would interpret it."3 1 In
other words, the court interpreted the individual tweet within its architec-
turally defined internal context.
2. The Role of Hyperlinks
The hyperlink is another architectural or technical feature of social
media that potentially amplifies the surrounding context of an allegedly
defamatory tweet or post. The approach of a California appellate court in
the non-precedential case of Redmond v. Gawker Media is instructive as
a method for applying the opinion privilege in light of the broader con-
text added to allegedly defamatory statements by hyperlinks.32 In that
case, the chief executive officer of various tech startup companies sued
for libel and false light after the tech blog Gizmodo posted an article
suggesting he used "technobabble" to promote products that were not
"technologically feasible."33 The article also stated that the CEO's "ven-
tures rarely-if ever-work"34 and that the CEO's business model was a
scam. 35 After the CEO complained to Gizmodo in a lengthy email,
Gizmodo posted the email on its site. The CEO sued Gizmodo's parent
27 Id. at 3.
28 Id. (quoting Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (some altera-
tions in original)).
29 Id. at 4.
30 Feld v. Conaway, 16 F.Supp.3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014).
1 Id.
32 No. CGC-ll-508414, 2012 WL 3243507, at *5-*7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
10, 2012).
3 3 Id. at *1.
34 id
3 Id at *2.
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company Gawker and the authors of the post. Defendants filed a motion
to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute.36 The trial court granted
the motion, and the California appellate court affirmed.
In concluding that the statements were opinion, the court relied on
the nature of the blog and the linguistic style of the posts.37 The court
found that the Gizmodo post concerned an "issue of public interest" and
the article's use of the term "scam" was not defamatory when read in
context.38 The court noted that 'scam' means different things to differ-
ent people, and it is used to describe a range of conduct," and the authors
gave links to "evidence" supporting their use of the term "scam." 39 The
court also stated that the term "scam" was mere opinion because it was
"incapable of being proven true or false," a conclusion apparently influ-
40
enced by the online context. Moreover, the authors used "qualifying
language" and emphasized that they "were expressing their personal,
subjective perspective rather than declaring objective facts."A1 The style
of the post also influenced the court's decision: the post's "casual first-
person style" made "little pretense of objectivity."42
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed heavy emphasis on the
presence of hyperlinks throughout the blog posts. 4 3 The court concluded
that the allegedly defamatory post contained only statements of opinion
because it was "completely transparent," revealing all the "sources upon
which the authors rel[ied] for their conclusions" and containing "active
links to many of the original sources."44 Therefore, the article "put [read-
ers] in a position to draw their own conclusions about [the CEO] and his
ventures." 4 5 As a result, the court concluded that the Gizmodo post
"c[ould] not provide the basis for a successful libel suit." 4 6 As this case
indicates, extensive linking to original sources-which is easy to do in
some social-media applications-should often help defendants escape
3 6 Id. SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participa-
tion. Anti-SLAPP statutes are designed to protect speakers from groundless libel
suits filed by their adversaries solely to chill their speech on matters of public
concern. Typically, an anti-SLAPP statute permits a libel defendant to file an
early motion to strike the plaintiffs complaint. The motion should be granted
unless the plaintiff can show, through pleadings and affidavits, she or he has a
probability of prevailing in the libel action. MASS MEDIA LAW, supra note 13, at
261.
3 7 See Redmond, 2012 WL 3243507, at *6-*7.
38Redmond, 2012 WL 3243507 at *4, *7.39 Id. at *6.
40 d
41 Id at *7
421 d. at *6.
43 Id. at *1, *6.
" Redmond, 2012 WL 3243507, at *6.
45 id
4 Id. at *7 (For this same reason, the plaintiff's false light action failed.).
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defamation liability.47 Hyperlinking signals that an author has relied on
underlying facts, which are themselves subject to multiple interpretations,
and invites the reader to test the reasonableness of the author's interpre-
tation rather than accept it as gospel.
3. Signals Sent by Hashtags
Another increasingly important feature of the infrastructure of many
social-media platforms is the hashtag, and it, too, is likely to implicate
contextual analysis in defamation cases. A hashtag is a brief statement
that categorizes or summarizes the post and uses a hash symbol (#) be-
fore a relevant keyword or phrase to make that word or phrase more rea-
dily searchable. 4 8 On most social-media platforms, hashtags are interac-
tive, so that clicking on a hashtagged word within a tweet or post will
show the reader other tweets or posts marked with that keyword.49 Hash-
tags that are used with the most frequency become "trending topics" that
are highlighted for other social-media users.50 Originated by users of
Twitter, the hashtag is now a common feature on other social-media plat-
forms, including Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, and Pinterest.5 1
Because hashtags are specifically designed to summarize, categorize,
and contextualize social-media speech, it is easy to see how they could
help lend important context to a statement that might or might not be
actionable defamation. To cite extreme examples, attaching "#justkid-
ding" to a tweet ought to mitigate or completely remove its defamatory
sting while attaching "#totallyserious" or "#imeanit" might magnify it.
Adding a hashtag that had been exclusively used in numerous previous
posts by people making facetious or sarcastic remarks--or, conversely,
that had been used primarily for a serious factual exchange-might con-
vey that the subsequent user of the hashtag was speaking in the same
vein. More subtle contextual clues might also be found within hashtags,
and courts that are striving to correctly determine defamatory meaning
47 See id. at *6-*7. See also Seldon v. Compass Rest., No. 03050/11, 2012
WL 5363518 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2012) (The court reached a similar con-
clusion, because "it [was] clear the ordinary reader would understand that the
writer's remarks describing plaintiff as a 'serial suer, scammer, spammer, em-
bezzler, and revenge artist,' are based on eight separate articles about plaintiff
which the writer found on the internet and references in the email.").
48 See Using Hashtags on Twitter, TWITER.COM https://support.twitter.com
/articles/49309 (last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
49 d.
50Id
5' See Public Conversations on Facebook, FACEBOOK.COM
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2013/06/public-conversations-on-facebook/ (an-
nouncing the introduction of clickable hashtag functionality on Facebook and
noting that their use would be "[s]imilar to other services like Instagram, Twitter,
Tumbir, or Pinterest").
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should not be indifferent to or ignorant of these social-media conven-
tions.
At least one recent case suggests that a hashtag can be actionable de-
famation in and of itself. In AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 52 a com-
pany that produces infrastructure management and governance software
sued one of its major competitors for libel. The plaintiff argued that the
competitor engaged in a defamatory social-media campaign designed to
give customers the false impression that AvePoint's software was not
made, developed, or supported in the United States.53 In particular, Ave-
Point alleged that these communications suggested that it was a Chinese
company rather than an American company.54 The company emphasized
that this false allegation would damage its reputation and harm its busi-
ness because clients within the federal government are statutorily re-
quired to give preference to domestic products, including software. 5s
One key component of the alleged defamation was a series of hash-
tags that the plaintiff claimed were designed to drive home the false
message about the company's country of origin. The hashtags included
"#Red," "#RedDragon," "#MADEINCHTNA," and "#SinkingRED-
Ship."56 Meanwhile, the competing company used hashtags "#USA" and
"#MADEINTHEUSA" in reference to itself.57 In denying the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss, the federal district court rejected the argument
that the hashtags were not actionable, applying standard libel doctrines
providing that "statements that are verifiably false or contain 'provably
false factual connotations' may be defamatory." 58 As is the common
practice in the medium, the hashtags were succinct and encapsulated
their primary point. The court determined those succinct encapsulations
conveyed verifiable statements of fact, though without extensive consid-
eration of the role of hashtags in social media. The court accepted, with-
out much question, that hashtags have the potential to amplify or modify
the context of postings in social media.
B. External Context
1. Social-Media Informality
To correctly determine whether a statement is opinion, courts some-
times must consider the conventions of discourse within social-media
environments. Internal, verbal clues within a text, such as poor grammar
and profanity, often signal something about the intended meaning an in-
dividual speaker wishes to convey. Yet in some social-media environ-
52 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 (W.D. Va. 2013).
53 Id at 503.
54
55Id. at 507.
16 Id at 520.
5 7 Id
ss Id at 506 (quoting WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E. 2d 383, 392 (Va. 2002)).
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ments, such signals are so widespread that they indicate a culture of in-
formality that may affect how all texts within the environment should be
read.59 Speakers often use informal language when talking to those they
know well (or believe they know well),60 and the use of informal lan-
guage by an individual speaker or a group of speakers may often be a
signal that most statements contributed to the discourse should not be
taken at face value.
Some courts have begun to suggest that the inherent informality of
certain social-media communications weighs in favor of reading a state-
ment as opinion rather than fact. In Giduck v. Niblett,61 the Colorado
Court of Appeals found that statements made on Facebook could not rea-
sonably be interpreted as factual statements based on their distinctive
"content, tone, and context." 62 The case involved an author who had
written books and given lectures on anti-terrorism topics and had spoken
of his training with Russian Airborne and Special Forces. A number of
individuals on Facebook 61uestioned the author's credentials and extent
of his authorial expertise. The author sued for defamation, citing more
than one hundred posts and online comments that he claimed discredited
him, including statements calling him a "charlatan" and stating that he
"clearly found his 'calling' . . . [from reading] too many Clancy novels"
and was "exaggerating his resume." 64
The court cited case law involving print media for the proposition
that "subjective judgments expressed in imaginative and hyperbolic
terms which neither contain nor imply verifiable fact" 65 deserve protec-
tion.66 The court also analogized its contextual analysis of the Facebook
posts to cases finding that statements that could be construed as verifia-
ble fact in the news pages of a newspaper would be protected opinion
when they appeared in a newspaper editorial section where "intemperate
and highly biased opinions are frequently presented and ... often times
should not be taken at face value"; 67 the court found these same charac-
teristics to be true of Facebook and similar online fora. The fact that the
59 See Redmond v. Gawker Media, No. CGC-l 1-508414, 2012 WL
3243507, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012) (supporting the conclusion that a
blog article contained "opinion rather than fact" by emphasizing its "casual
first-person style" and the fact it made "little pretense of objectivity"). See also
Obsidian Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 2014).
60 Formal and Informal Language, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/grammar/british-grammar/formal-and-
informal-language.
6 No. 13CA0775, 2014 WL 2986670 (Colo. App. 2014).62 1d. at *11.





67 Id. at *10 (citing Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1301 (Colo. 1994)).
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communication took place in a context in which anonymous speech was
common further militated "in favor of finding these statements to be
opinion."
Another state appellate court reached a similar conclusion by stress-
ing the informal nature of social media in Rochester City Lines, Co. v.
City of Rochester.69 In that case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals af-
firmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of an elected councilman
who tweeted angry comments during a public transit contract bidding
process.70 The councilman used language that, divorced of context,
could have been viewed as assertions of fact imputing criminal activi-
ty-including the suggestion that certain parties held the public "hos-
tage," made "ransom demands," engaged in "extortion" and "robbery,"
and "stole ... from taxpayers."71 The court noted that these phrases are
"commonly used rhetorically to describe behavior the speaker might
consider distasteful or morally suspect, but not criminal." 72
The court further stated that "although the words used ... can be
used to describe criminal activity, in context, they [could] only reasona-
bly be understood as protected rhetorical speech." 73 Significantly, the
court reached this conclusion by applying a contextual inquiry: "the con-
text of [the] statements was inherently informal," which tilted in favor of
interpreting them as "opinion and hyperbole, and not statements of fact
capable of being proven true or false.,74 The court further speculated on
the habits of reasonable readers of the defendant's tweets, explaining that
"no reasonable person would believe" that the tweets implied actual
criminal behavior. Furthermore, "'even the most careless reader must
have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole."',
75
The court's analysis of the tweets' meaning was aided by its understand-
ing of the relaxed tone commonly used by individuals engaged in social-
media exchanges, and the court imputed the same understanding to rea-
sonable readers of the tweet. In light of this understanding, the court
concluded that the tweets were not defamatory but were instead mere
opinion.
2. Contextual Clues Specific to a Single Social-Media Platform
Different social-media platforms have different conventions, and
these conventions form part of the external context that courts should
681 d at 10.
69 846 N.W.2d 444, 466-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).70 Id at 466.
71 Id at 464-65.
72 Id. at 466.
73 id.
74
75 Id. (quoting Greenbelt Co-op Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14
(1970)).
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consider in determining the meaning of statements posted there. A good
illustration of the type of analysis courts should use is presented by
Chaker v. Mateo. 6 In Chaker, a California appellate court held that
harshly negative comments about the plaintiff posted by his child's ma-
ternal grandmother on Ripoffreport.com and Topix.com were not action-
able defamation.77 The grandmother posted, among other things, that the
plaintiff was a "deadbeat dad" and suggested that he was homeless and
picked up streetwalkers. In concluding that the statements were nonac-
tionable opinion, the court focused largely on: (1) the nature of the sites
where the grandmother posted, and (2) the fact that the plaintiff was em-
broiled in a paternity and child support dispute with the defendant's
daughter.79
The court explained that "all [statements] were made on Internet
Web sites which plainly invited the sort of exaggerated and insulting
criticisms of businesses and individuals which occurred here." 80 The
"overall thrust" of the defendant's statements portrayed the plaintiff as "a
dishonest and scary person." Given the context, however, the "average
Internet reader" would not view the defendant's "embellishments"-that
is, her statements about plaintiff being homeless and picking up street-
walkers-"as anything more than insulting name calling." 82 This name-
calling, according to the court, is what readers "would expect from
someone who had an unpleasant personal or business relationship with
[the plaintiff] and was angry with him," especially since the insults were
general in nature.83 The only potentially actionable statement made by
the grandmother, according to the court, was the statement that plaintiff
was a criminal, but that statement was true.84
76 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
77Id. The court in Chaker first suggested that the plaintiff's decision to join
a social networking site made his character a matter of public interest. Id. at 502.
Based on this somewhat dubious logic, anyone who joins a social network in-
vites criticism from other users and automatically gives up a measure of legal
protection for her reputation.
78 Id at 498.
' Id at 504.80 id.
81id
82 Chaker, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 504.
83 Id
84 Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to strike Chak-
er's complaint. A judge in a 2009 Twitter libel case also appears to have ac-
cepted that a Twitter user's habit of employing sarcasm and hyperbole was rele-
vant to interpreting her allegedly defamatory tweet, though the case is not
precedential. In Horizon Grp. Mgmt. v. Bonnen, a property management compa-
ny, Horizon Group Management, sued tenant Amanda Bonnen for defamation in
Illinois state court based on her tweet: "Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment
was bad for you? Horizon realty thinks it's ok." Complaint at 1 7, Horizon Grp.
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As the Chaker court recognized, the prevalence of emotional, hyper-
bolic discourse within a particular social-media forum affects whether
readers will interpret statements as asserting facts or merely opinions.
Yet, accepting this principle means that to interpret an allegedly defama-
tory statement, the interpreter, whether judge or jury, must examine the
exact nature of the social-media forum. This examination should take
into account where the defendant posted the statement and the nature of
the language he or she employed. Obviously, the quality of the interpre-
tation of the allegedly defamatory statement hinges on the interpreter's
familiarity with the conventions of discourse within different social-
media forums. That familiarity is likely to grow with time as more citi-
zens use different types of social media.
However, advocates should be aware of the need to educate deci-
sion-makers about how different forums work. For example, Snapchat is
used differently, and by a different demographic of speakers, than Face-
book. By the same token, Facebook users have a different demographic
profile, and tend to use the medium differently, than Twitter users. These
differences should influence the proper interpretation of the statements
posted in each forum. Nonetheless, based on lessons drawn from Internet
libel cases, courts should not dismiss as "opinion" all statements made in
Mgmt. v. Bonnen, No. 2009 L 008675 (lll. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2009),
http://www.dmlp.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-07-27-Horizon%20
Complaint.pdf. At the time she posted, Bonnen had only twenty people sub-
scribing to, or "following," her Twitter posts. Horizon alleged that Bonnen's
defamatory tweet harmed its "reputation in its business," and therefore consti-
tuted libel per se, which under Illinois law allowed reputational harm to be pre-
sumed without the requirement of proof. Id. at I 10. Horizon sought $50,000 in
damages. Id. Bonnen moved for dismissal, arguing that her tweet could not rea-
sonably be interpreted as defamatory because it was imprecise and, when read
in context, did not state verifiable facts about Horizon. Memorandum of Law in
Support of 2-615 Motion to Dismiss at 11, Horizon Grp. Mgmt. v. Bonnen, No.
2009 L 008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.dmlp.org/sites/
citmedialaw.org/files/2009-11-I OBonnen%20Motion%20to%2ODismiss.pdf.
She asked the court to consider her Twitter history as part of the relevant context
for interpreting her statement. Id. at 8-9. She contended that her tweets as a
whole represented "off the cuff reflection or opinion" and contained "exaggera-
tions." Id. at 9. She pointed to tweets, for example, that said: "[c]all me or else
we are not friends" (Id. at 8) and "[a]ll of these people eating at McDonalds is
making me want to hurl." Id. at 9. She further argued that "any reasonable read-
er of [her] Tweets would not take them literally" and would instead understand
them as rhetorical hyperbole. Id. The trial court judge evidently agreed and held
that her statements were nonactionable as a matter of law, though the court filed
no written opinion. Dismissal Order, Horizon Grp. Mgmt. v. Bonnen, No. 2009
L 008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2010).
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a social-media context,85 given the real and often permanent damage to
reputations digital libels can inflict.
3. The Context of Rankings and Reviews
Rankings and reviews, which are increasingly common in the social-
media sphere, can create a social-media context that seems particularly
likely to weigh in favor of a finding of opinion. A number of courts in
the United States have accepted the notion that the reasonable reader
may be less likely to interpret statements as conveying actual facts in
these online and social-media contexts.86 For example, in a 2014 blog-
libel case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied
on the nature of the site where the defendant posted her statements as a
key factor in labeling her statements opinion. In that case, Obsidian
Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, the court concluded that the determination
of whether a statement is actionable is based on the "general tenor of the
work," the defendant's use of "figurative or hyperbolic language," and
whether the statement can be proved true or false.88
Applying these factors, the court held that the very name of defen-
dant's site, obsidianfinancesucks.com, would lead readers to expect
statements posted there to be "one-sided."8 The court further cited the
defendant's use of "extreme language" as a factor that "negate[d] the
impression that [her] blog posts assert objective facts." 90 Finally, the
court agreed with the district court's conclusion that "in the context of a
non-professional website containing consistently hyperbolic language,
85 See William Charron, Twitter: A "Caveat Emptor" Exception To Libel
Law?, 1 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 57, 64 (2012) (arguing that while "Twit-
ter should not provide automatic immunity from a claim of libel . . . Twitter may
present a particular environment in which to more readily dismiss claims" as
"the limited amount of information in loosely composed Tweets should most
often be perceived as 'opinions."').
86 See Sandals Resorts Int'l v. Google, Inc., 86 A.D.3d 32, 42 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46 (N.Y. 1996)).
87 See Obsidian Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (9th Cir.
2014).
" Id. at 1293.
89 id.
90 d. at 1294. See also Obsidian Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d
1220, 1223 (D. Or. 2011) ("[B]logs are a subspecies of online speech which
inherently suggest that statements made there are not likely provable assertions
of fact."), rev'd on other grounds, Obsidian Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Cox, 740 F.3d
1284, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 2014); Global Telemedia Int'l v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d
1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting as early as 2001 that online communication
often "lacks the formality and polish typically found in documents in which a
reader would expect to find facts); Nicosia v. De Roy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1106
(N.D. Cal. 1999) ("[I]n the context of the heated debate on the Internet, readers
are more likely to understand accusations of lying as figurative, hyperbolic ex-
pressions.").
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[defendant]'s blog posts are 'not sufficiently factual to be true or
false."' 9 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted
similar arguments in a 2013 social-media case involving TripAdvisor's
list of "Dirtiest Hotels."92 There, the court relied both on the general te-
nor of defendant's post as well as the "broader context" in concluding
the post was not defamatory.93 Plaintiff Kenneth Seaton, the sole owner
of Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center ("Grand Resort"), sued
TripAdvisor for defamation and false light invasion of privacy for plac-
ing his hotel on its "2011 Dirtiest Hotels List."94 After removing the case
to federal court, TripAdvisor filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that its
placement of the Grand Resort on the list constituted nonactionable opi-
nion. In response, Seaton moved to amend his complaint and add addi-
tional claims for trade libel/injurious falsehood and tortious interference
with prospective business relationships.
The federal district court granted TripAdvisor's motion to dismiss
and denied Seaton's motion to amend as futile. The appeals court af-
firmed, holding that TripAdvisor's placement of Seaton's hotel on its
dirtiest hotels list was "not capable of being understood as defamato-
ry."9 5 The court based this conclusion, first, on the fact that the "superla-
tive" term "dirtiest" was "loose, hyperbolic language."96 Second, the
court emphasized the "general tenor" of the list, which billed itself as a
product of user reviews rather than "scientific study," with the user re-
views being full of hyperbole and subjective accounts of travelers' expe-
riences.97
Finally, the court placed the TripAdvisor list in the "broader context"
of online rankings.98 The court noted that TripAdvisor's compilation of
user comments was part of a broader online trend of "'to? ten' lists and
the like appear[ing] with growing frequency on the web." 9 Thus, "a rea-
sonable observer understands that placement on and ranking within the
bulk of such lists constitutes opinion, not a provable fact."loo Although
the plaintiff contended that TripAdvisor employed a flawed methodology
for ranking user comments, the court found that "the subjective weighing
of factors cannot be proven false and therefore cannot be the basis of a
91 See Obsidian, 740 F.3d at 1294.





9 Id. at 598-99.
"
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defamation claim." 10 Indeed, the court's opinion repeatedly stressed the
subjectivity of such rankings as a basis for affirming dismissal of plain-
tiff's claim.
In some ways, the court's analysis missed the point: the rankings
clearly assert the fact-which arguably could be verified objectively-
that plaintiff's hotel was dirty, whether or not it was the dirtiest hotel in
the United States. Moreover, the court's reasoning could be misconstrued
to allow speakers to avoid defamation liability by hiding behind flawed
ratings algorithms. Nonetheless, the decision suggests that courts are
taking note of conventions of discourse within social media, including
the aggregation of consumer reviews on ratings sites, and are willing to
recognize the expressive value of user interactions as a form of protected
opinion.
All told, the small body of published decisions does suggest that
courts will take into account the external and internal contexts of social
media in interpreting whether a defendant's statement is defamatory.' 02
Some have argued that courts should treat almost all material posted to
Facebook, Twitter, or other such sites as opinion or hyperbole, 0 3 but this
argument has not gained traction. 104 Nor should it. Defamation law
should continue to play a role in preventing character assassination and
guaranteeing that public discourse has at least some anchor in truth, even
in the social-media age. 05
III. ACTUAL MALICE AND THE SOCIAL-MEDIA DEFENDANT
Fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in the seminal
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the First Amendment re-
quires libel plaintiffs who are public officials to prove actual malice-
that is, that the defendant published a defamatory statement with know-
101 Id
102 See, e.g., Obsidian, 740 F.3d at 1293-94; Seaton v. TripAdvisor L.L.C.,
728 F.3d 592, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012).
103 A similar issue was raised when a defendant posted defamatory com-
ments on a website designed as a place for disgruntled customers to voice com-
plaints. See Order Denying Defendants' Special Motion to Strike; Granting
Plaintiffs' Special Motion to Strike, Piping Rock Partners Inc. v. David Lerner
Associates Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ("Defendants also
assert that the very context of the posting - an anonymous website for disgrun-
tled consumers - creates a presumption that the posting is unreliable and there-
fore non-actionable opinion. The Court disagrees[.J"). While this website was
not a social-media site per se, a similar argument could be made with social-
media websites.
' Charron, supra note 85, at 64-65 (noting that while tweets are often per-
ceived as opinion, "Twitter should not provide automatic immunity from a claim
of libel"); see also Walsh v. Latham, No. SCV 251041, 2014 WL 618995, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014) (refusing to find that reasonable readers could not
take accusations on Facebook seriously).
los See Silencing John Doe, supra note 5, at 103.
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ledge or reckless disregard of its falsity.106 The Court subsequently ex-
tended the actual malice rule to public figures and even to private-figure
plaintiffs involved in matters of public concern if they wish to recover
presumed or punitive damages.'0 7 The Court crafted these constitutional
protections for libel defendants in cases involving the institutional press,
but most commentators and lower courts have read the Court's complex
body of defamation jurisprudence as extending the protections to "non-
media defendants"' 08 as well. Hence, social-media defendants should be
able to avoid liability in cases where plaintiffs cannot establish actual
malice.
It is unclear, however, how courts and juries should determine
whether a tweet or Facebook post was made with actual malice. The Su-
preme Court cases elucidating the concept of actual malice predominant-
ly involved media defendants-members of the institutional press-and
the Court's examples of actual malice reflect the investigative practices
of the institutional press. Thus, the Court has stated that for a plaintiff to
establish actual malice, "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication."' 09 Actual malice, for example, exists if a defen-
dant invents a story, bases it on "an unverified anonymous telephone
call," publishes statements that are "so inherently improbable that only a
reckless man would have put them in circulation," or publishes them
despite "obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of [an] informant or the
accuracy of his reports."" 0 These examples have little resonance for
"publishers" in a social-media context, many of whom post information
spontaneously, with little verification other than perhaps a perusal of
other social-media sources. The typical social-media defendant is less
likely than her traditional-media counterpart to rely on informants stra-
tegically placed within government or corporate hierarchies. The typical
social-media defendant is less likely to carefully analyze primary sources
before publishing. Moreover, the typical social-media defendant has no
fact-checker, editor, or legal counsel and is less likely than institutional-
media publishers to have either special training in gauging the credibility
of sources or professional ethics that prize accuracy over speed.
In fact, the culture of some social-media sites, such as Twitter and
Reddit, encourage users to be the first to share breaking news and infor-
mation.' It is unclear how this emphasis on speed of publication should
106 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964).
107 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
108 Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New
Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1562
(1987).
'0 Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
Id. at 732.
"' See, e.g., Doug Stanglin, Student Wrongly Tied to Boston Bombings
Found Dead, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
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affect the actual malice determination. Does the fact that a defamation
defendant posted or tweeted in an attempt to "break the news first" tip
the scale in favor of, or against, a finding of actual malice? Similarly, it
is unclear how the fact that most social-media posters lack journalism
training, and many lack critical analytical faculties, should affect the ac-
tual malice determination. Does it constitute reckless disregard of a
statement's falsity if a defendant irrationally believes her defamatory
accusation to be true?
A partial answer to that question can be gleaned from accounts of the
first full jury trial for Twitter libel in the United States, in which the jury
found that celebrity defendant Courtney Love lacked actual malice." 2
The outcome is particularly noteworthy because Love had been a Twitter
libel defendant before; indeed, in 2009 she became the first person in the
United States to be sued for so-called "Twibel." But that was not her on-
ly first. As of December 2015, Love appears to be the only person in the
United States to be sued for Twibel more than once."1 3 In addition, Love
has been sued for posting allegedly libelous statements on the social-
media site Pinterest. 114
story/news/2013/04/25/boston-bombing-social-media-student-brown-university-
reddit/2112309/; Craig Timberg, Brother of Newtown School Shooter Races to
Dispel False ID on Facebook: 'It Wasn't Me', WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 14,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/brother-of-newtown-
school-shooter-races-to-dispel-false-id-on-facebook-it-wasnt-me/2012/12/14/
aae43c82-4637-lle2-9648-a2c323a99Id6 story.html (Newtown shooter's
brother mistakenly named as shooter)
112 Corina Knoll, Singer-actress Courtney Love Wins Landmark Twitter Li-
bel Case, Los ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/
2014/jan/24/local/la-me-love-libel-20140125.
13id.
I 4 Complaint at¶ 22, Simorangkir v. Love, 2013 WL 5213465 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Sept. 17, 2013) (No. BC521565). Simorangkir sued Love a second time for
statements made on Pinterest subsequent to the settlement in her first case,
which would mean that Love has actually been sued for libel in social media in
three separate cases. Simorangkir's second lawsuit also alleged that Love had
made defamatory statements about Simorangkir when discussing the first suit
on the Howard Stem radio show. The complaint in the case states that "Love
hired an addiction psychiatrist to try to assert a so-called insanity defense" to the
first libel claim. Id. at 1. See also Eriq Gardner, Courtney Love Back in Trouble
with Latest Defamation Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/courtney-love-back-trouble-latest-
681964 (According to media accounts, a California judge in February 2014 re-
jected Love's motion to strike the complaint, noting that the plaintiff was not a
public figure and that a jury could very well find Love's statements to be mali-
cious, especially in light of the prior settlement with Simorangkir.); Pamela
Chelin, Judge Crushes Courtney Love s Attempt to Duck Libel Lawsuit, SPIN
(Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.spin.com/articles/courtney-love-dawn-simorangkir-
libel-lawsuit-howard-stem/.
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The first Twitter libel case against Love arose out of a business dis-
pute between Love and fashion designer Dawn Simorangkir, also known
as the "Boudoir Queen."s1 5 Love, dissatisfied with the Boudoir Queen's
attempts to transform some old clothing into designer dresses, posted
allegedly defamatory statements about the Queen on Twitter, MySpace,
and Etsy. Love tweeted allegations that Simorangkir "has a history of
dealing cocaine, lost custody of her children, has a history of assault and
burglary, and has a record of prostitution."'1 6 Love also wrote, "so good-
bye asswipe nasty lying hosebag thief," as well as "my clothes my
WARDROBE! oi vey dont fuck with my wradrobe or you willend up in
a circle of corched eaeth hunted til your dead. [sic]"117 Love, who had an
estimated 40,000 Twitter followers at the time, made similar statements
on MySpace and Etsy. Love's attorneys initially claimed that she was
acting in the "public interest" by warning others about "Simorangkir's
pattern of criminal and bad faith conduct."' 8 A California trial court,
however, rejected these arguments and held that the dispute involved "a
'discrete private dispute' between [Love] and Simorangkir." 119
According to news accounts, Love settled the libel claim in early 2011
for $430,000. 120
Love, however, did not learn her lesson from her first tangle with
Twibel. In 2010, Love tweeted that her former attorney Rhonda Holmes
was "bought off." Holmes sued Love in California state court for $8 mil-
lion, arguing that the tweet accused Holmes of bribery. Love contended
that her tweet was merely hyperbole.' 21 News accounts of the jury ver-
dict in Love's favor, however, indicate that the jury found that Love did
not post her tweet with actual malice.1 2 2 The jury deliberated for three
hours at the end of the seven-day trial before concluding that the plaintiff
'15 Complaint, Simorangkir v. Love, 2009 WL 798260 (Cal. Super. Ct. May
5, 2009) (No. BC410593).
16 Id. at124.
117 id.
118 Motion to Strike at 3, Simorangkir v. Love, 2009 WL 798260 (Cal. Su-
per. Ct. Aug. 19, 2009) (No. BC410593), http://www.dmlp.org/threats/
simorangkir-v-love.
" Matthew Heller, Judge Allows Twitter Libel Suit Against Rocker Love,
ON POINT (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.onpointnews.com/NEWS/Judge-Allows-
Twitter-Libel-Suit-Against-Rocker-Love.html.
120 Jennifer Preston, Courtney Love Settles Twitter Defamation Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9BOCE5DF1330F934A35750COA9679D8B63.
121 Love also claimed that she did not mean to send out the tweet to all of
her followers but instead meant to send it as a "direct message" only to two.
Knoll, supra note 112. Under traditional defamation doctrines, sending to two
people would still constitute "publication," though Love's intent to direct mes-
sage the tweet to a limited audience might be relevant to damages.
122 id
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had not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Love knew her
statements were false or doubted their truth.1 23
The Courtney Love Twibel saga did not set any precedents, but it
does raise interesting issues for future cases. According to court docu-
ments and news accounts, Love consulted a psychiatrist for an alleged
"addiction" to social media. Certainly, Love's actions in the series of
defamation cases she has generated do not seem entirely rational, but
there is no insanity defense to a libel claim. Even so, the determination
of whether a defendant had actual malice is a subjective one, meaning
that a relevant factor in that determination is whether the defendant suf-
fered from a mental illness that caused her to have irrational, or even
delusional, beliefs about the truth of a statement she posted on social
media. It seems problematic, however, for the law to give no recourse to
the victims of mentally disordered defamers pursuing social-media ven-
dettas based on fantasies they have concocted. As a practical matter, this
problem is likely to be solved by the skepticism of juries, who will rarely
accept a defendant's argument that she truly believed her delusional and
defamatory statements.
Nonetheless, the number of Facebook "friends" or Twitter "follow-
ers" to whom a defendant publishes a defamatory statement arguably
magnifies the harm a defamatory statement causes to a plaintiff's reputa-
tion by magnifying the size of the audience. Courtney Love, for example,
had an estimated 281,000 Twitter followers as of April 2014 and an es-
timated 1.5 million as of May 2015. Each of these followers is capable
of retweeting any of Love's missives with ease from their smartphones
or computers. Arguably, the number of Love's followers amplifies the
damages the victims of her libelous tweets should receive, because pre-
sumably their reputations were injured in the eyes of more people.1 2 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Social-media libel cases create a challenge for United States courts
seeking to balance reputational interests with freedom of expression.
Most Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence is tailored to the needs
and interests of the institutional press, but social media are generating a
growing tide of cases involving so-called non-media defendants. Social-
123 See Pamela Chelin, Courtney Love Found Not Liable in Landmark Twit-
ter Defamation Case, SPIN (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.spin.com/articles/
courtney-love-twitter-defamation-lawsuit-verdict-guilty/. See also Kevin
McCoy, Courtney Love Tweets After Trial Win, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/01/25/jury-sides-with-
courtney-love-in-trial-over-tweet/4882997/.
124 Full analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this article, since it is an
unresolved issue. See Jeff Hermes, How Should We Measure Damages for De-
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media libel decisions are still so new that it is hard to draw firm conclu-
sions about the effect they will have on the law of defamation in the
United States. Still, one can identify some emerging trends. Although
social-media libel opinions are few, and published opinions fewer still,
they reflect a growing judicial understanding of the nature and impor-
tance of social media as a communications tool.
Some of the opinions, for example, explicitly reference the informal
nature of social-media sites as a basis for branding allegedly libelous
speech posted there as opinion. Moreover, some explicitly point to the
prevalence of subjective reviews of service providers and business as a
basis for dismissal of the inevitable libel suits such reviews provoke.
Nonetheless, there are numerous undecided issues in social-media defa-
mation, such as whether a plaintiff's voluntary use of social media
makes her a public figure. Social-media cases may also prompt rethink-
ing of some basic defamation doctrines, such as whether courts should
limit the protection of the actual malice rule when delusional defamers
pursue imagined vendettas based on invented "facts." For now, it is too
soon to make firm conclusions, but the brave new world of social-media
defamation law promises to force courts and commentators to rethink the
balance between protecting "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 125
speech and safeguarding citizens against character assassination.
125 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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